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Female wages in Bangladesh are significantly lower compared to male wages. This paper 
seeks to quantify the extent of discrimination in explaining this gender wage gap. We 
decompose the gender wage differential into a component that can be explained by 
differences in productive characteristics and a component unexplained by observable 
productive differences, which are attributed to discrimination. We examine this issue 
both for rural and urban areas in Bangladesh, using individual level unit record data. 
Methodologically, we use a number of different approaches to decompose the wage gap 
between the “explained” and the “unexplained” components. Our results show that 
gender wage differentials are considerably larger in urban areas compared to rural areas. 
The decomposition analysis suggests that a significant portion of this gender wage gap 
results from discrimination. We also find that failure to correct for sample selection bias 
leads to a significant under estimation of the gender wage gap in both rural and urban 
areas. Our results have significant policy implications.  
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It is now fairly well-established that women lag behind men in many domains in 
developing countries. Gender differences are noticeable in several spheres. For example, 
women have less access to and control over resources, few opportunities are made 
available to them at the workplace and they are disproportionately represented in the 
political scene. While women incur the direct costs of these inequalities, these costs are 
eventually borne by the society as a whole. The nature and extent of this inequality varies 
considerably across countries, and is related to the basis and structure of the economic 
system of a nation. One of the most visible examples in this perspective is inequality in 
wages based on gender. Women on average earn less than men for similar work and the 
gap varies across nations. In developing regions, like Southern Asia, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa the average gap between men’s and women’s income are 47% and 56% 
respectively, while in relatively rich regions like in North America and in Europe the 
wage gap is considerably lower.  
Wage inequalities between races or between gender groups exist in almost every 
country and one can think of two main reasons for this. First, individuals of different 
race/gender groups may choose to accumulate different levels of productive skills. This 
may be motivated by, among other things, culture, geographic proximity or historical 
reasons. Second, even in the presence of equal endowments of productive skills, wage 
inequality may persist if employers reward productive skills differently depending on the 
race/gender group of the worker. Such potential cause of wage inequalities is usually 
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attributed to discrimination at the workplace [Becker (1957), Phelps (1972) and Arrow 
(1972)]. Becker’s work provided the background for subsequent work by Oaxaca (1973), 
Blinder (1973), Reimers (1983), Neumark (1988), and Cotton (1988). The methodology 
developed in these papers has been used to examine gender wage discrimination in a 
number of different (though primarily developed) countries. A small number of studies 
now exists on countries in Latin America [Psacharpoulos and Tzannatos (1992)], Africa 
[Knight and Sabot (1982); Appleton, Hoddinott and Krishnan (1999);  Glick and Sahn 
(1997)] and transitional economies of Eastern and Central Europe [Brainerd (1998); 
Reilly and Newell (2000); Jurajda (2001); Adamchik and Bedi (2003)]. All these studies 
identify active discrimination against women in the labour market. In the context of Asia, 
Horton (1996) in a seven–country study of women in East Asian labour markets finds 
that differences in returns to male and female characteristics account for at least half the 
gap between male and female earnings. Recent studies on South Asia have yielded 
similar results. Jacob (2006) explores the changes in the wage gap between caste and 
gender groups in India between 1983 and 1999 – 2000 using a nationally representative 
data set. He observes that about 55% of the wage gap between men and women in 1999 
cannot be explained by differences in productive characteristics and endowments. Akter 
(2005), in a study of the rural labour market in Bangladesh, finds that 70% of the total 
wage gap is due to within job discrimination. The few other studies that exist in 
Bangladesh have almost exclusively focussed on the urban manufacturing sector and 
report that differences in the wage rates of men and women cannot be accounted for by 




women may play a role [Majumder and Zohir (1993); Majumder and Mahmud (1994) 
and Zohir (1998)].  
This paper examines gender inequality in wages in Bangladesh. The labour 
market in Bangladesh is gender segregated with the bulk of women’s work taking place 
in non-market activities in the home or in the informal sector. Those in the formal sector 
(public and private) are generally employed in female intensive industries (for example 
RMG sector, shrimp processing, and pharmaceuticals). Additionally upward mobility for 
female labourers is very limited. Inferring the differences in wages that stem from such 
labour market segregation could provide some insight into evidence of discrimination 
against women. Women in paid employment in both rural and urban areas often receive 
lower wages than men, even after controlling for type of employment, status of 
employment, occupation and hours of work.
4 Although the labour code of the country 
stipulates equal pay for equal work
5, little is known about the exact characteristics of pay 
levels to clearly assess this difference. 
 
2 The Empirical Specification 
In general, the quantifiable measures of discrimination against women focus extensively 
on the magnitude of the wage gap between males and females. The most commonly used 
technique is the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method [Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
                                                 
4 For example in the urban regions female wage rates was 50% of that of males in 1995-96 declining 
further to 46% in 1999-2000. In rural regions the ratio has remained constant at 44% over the same period 
(source: Report of the LFS 1995 – 96 and 1999 – 2000, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics).  
5 Bangladesh has enacted a number of laws at the national level to eliminate discrimination against women 
and girls in all spheres. For example: Convention for Elimination of Discrimination against Women 




(1973)]. They decompose the wage differential into a component explained by 
differences in personal characteristics of workers that affected their productivity and a 
component unexplained by observable productive differences which they attribute to 
discrimination.  
We start by estimating separate (log) hourly wage equations for males () m  and 
females  () f . This allows for different rewards by gender to the same set of productive 
characteristics or endowments. The wage equations have the following form: 
ln ; 1, , ; , ij j ij j ij YX i n j m f α βε =+ + = = K      (1) 
ij Y ln   is the natural log of hourly wages,  j α  is an intercept term for gender group 
;, jj m f = ,  ij X  is a vector of characteristics for individual i who belongs to gender 
category  j  and  j β  is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, ij ε  is the error term with 
zero mean and constant variance.  Equation (1) is estimated using OLS, separately for 
males and females.  
Define  D as the difference in the expected values of male and female wages 
obtained by estimating equation (1) separately for males and females. We can then write:  
    ()    ()
()      ()    ()
1 ln ln im if
mf im if mf








=− + − + −
   (2) 
where       and  ; , j j j m f βα =  denote the corresponding estimated values of  j β  and  j α  
respectively. The first term in the right hand side  ( ) 
im if m XX β ⎡ ⎤ − ⎣ ⎦ is the explained 




mean, evaluated by the male wage equation. The second term     ( ) if mf X ββ ⎡ ⎤ −
⎣ ⎦
 is the 
unexplained portion. It is the difference in the return to each wage determinant received 
by males and females, evaluated at the mean set of women’s characteristics. The third 
term,    
mf α α ⎡⎤ − ⎣⎦  is the difference between the constants. The latter two terms arise from 
differences in the coefficients in the wage equations (both intercepts and slopes) for men 
and women and is usually interpreted as a measure of labour market discrimination after 
adjusting for differences in observable characteristics (in other words, the adjusted wage 
gap). 
An alternative way of writing equation (2) is to take the female wage structure as 
the non-discriminatory norm
 . Then the decomposition becomes: 
( )     ( )    ( ) 2 ln ln mf im if im if im fm f DYY X X X β ββ αα =−=− + − + −          (3)  
Comparison of equations (2) and (3) lead us to an important question: what is the non-
discriminatory wage structure to be used for comparison purposes? The original method 
used both male and female wage structures as the non-discriminatory norm. This creates 
an “index number” problem, since the choice of male and female wage structures as the 
competitive standard do not yield the same estimate for the discrimination component. 
Further, the resulting levels of discrimination provide a range within which the actual 
level of discrimination falls. Reimers (1983) hypothesizes that the correct procedure is 
instead to take an average of the range. Cotton (1988) and Neumark (1988) suggest 
improving upon the procedure by employing a weighted-average of the two wage 




Cotton (1988) argues that in the presence of discrimination, the wage structure 
can be decomposed as follows: first, males are paid a premium for their productivity 
characteristics as a result of nepotism; second, females have their characteristics 
undervalued as a result of discrimination. He has, therefore, argued for estimating a non-
discriminatory wage structure through a linear combination of the male and female wage 
structures. The resulting decomposition can be written as follows: 
()      ( )
   ( )
   ( ) 3 ln ln mf im if im if im if mf DY Y X X X X β ββ β β αα
∗∗ ∗
= − = − + −+ −+−      (4) 
where   β
∗
 is a non-discriminatory wage structure that is common to both men and women 
in the economy. The first term,  ()  
im if XX β
∗ ⎡⎤ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
of the decomposition is the explained 
component. The second term     ( ) im m X ββ
∗ ⎡⎤ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 and the third term     () if f X ββ
∗ ⎡⎤ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 
represent the male treatment advantage and the female treatment disadvantage, 
respectively. The sum of the last three terms is considered to be an indicator of the extent 
of discrimination. 
Remember that    β
∗
 is unobservable and we define    β
∗
 as  
    
   
mf mf β ρβ ρβ
∗
=+                                 (5) 
where,  m ρ is the proportion of the male workforce and  f ρ is the proportion of the female 
workforce in the samples, and   
m β and   
f β are the estimated parameters from the male and 
female wage regressions. 
  




One potential problem with the decomposition approaches discussed above is that they do 
not account for sample selection bias. The wage equations are applied to a sample of 
employed men and women, whose selection criteria are not random because we do not 
have wage data for those who are unemployed. Since the characteristics of the employed 
population in the labour force might not mirror that of the whole population, the OLS 
results obtained may be biased and inconsistent: the standard problem of selectivity bias.  
In this paper we revisit the sample selection problem and the likely consequences 
of this selection issue on the gender wage gap. We start by estimating the selection 
(employment) equation where, individual i is assumed to choose his or her employment 
status according to a probit model:  
ii i IZ γ μ =+               , i ∀ i=1,…….,n  (6) 
where  i I  is a dummy variable denoting employment status. We estimate separate 
employment status regressions for males and females. Having estimated equation (6), we 











= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −Φ ⎝⎠
, which is included as an additional 
explanatory variable in wage equations given by (1). The expanded wage equations can 
be written as:  
ln ; , ij j ij j j ij ij YX j m f α βθ λε = ++ + =    (7) 
j θ  denotes the covariance between the errors in the selection equation and the wage 
equation (one for each gender group j).  Equation (7) takes into account the correlation 
between  ij ε  and ij μ .
6  
We can now compute the extended gender wage gap as:   
                                                 




     ()      ( )    ( ) $ $ ( ) 4 ln ln mf m f mm f im if im if if im if DYYX X X β ββ αα θ λθ λ =−=− + − + − + −   (8) 
The observed wage differential ( if im Y Y ln ln − ) is now the sum of the following 
components: the contribution of endowment differences or the explained 
portion ()  
m im if XX β ⎡⎤ − ⎣⎦ , the unexplained portion which is attributed to labour market 
discrimination     ( )    () mf mf if X ββ αα ⎡⎤ −+−
⎣⎦
, and the contribution of differences in the 
average selectivity bias $ $ () mf im if θλ θλ ⎡⎤ −
⎣⎦
7.  
The incidence of sample selection bias indicates that the observed mean log-wage 
differential will differ from the unobserved differential in terms of wage offers (Kidd and 
Viney (1991)). Therefore, it is convenient to rewrite equation (8) in the following form: 
() $ $ () ( )     ( )    () ln ln f mm f mm f im if if im im if if YY X X X θ λθ λ β β β αα − + − = − + −+− (9) 
Here the left-hand side provides the measure of differences in the offered wage (the sum 
of the difference in the observed mean wages and the difference in the average selectivity 
bias). The only difference between equation (8) and equation (9) is that, equation (9) 
presents a decomposition of the selectivity adjusted wage difference as opposed to a 
decomposition of the observed wage difference in equation (8). 
We can rewrite equation (9) by taking the female wage structure as the non-
discriminatory norm: 
         () $ $ () ( )     ( )    () ln ln f mm f fm f im if if im im if im YY X X X θ λθ λ β β β αα −+−= − + − + −  (10) 
                                                 
7  This part may be viewed as the differences in unobservable which influence wages. Following Hoffman 




The information derived from equations (9) and (10) will allow us to decompose 
differences in observed and offered wages into the ‘explained’ and ‘discriminatory’ 
components.  
 
3 The Data 
The dataset that we use for empirical estimation is obtained from the LFS 1999 – 2000 in 
the form of unit record files.  This dataset has information on 34998 individuals aged 10 
years and above, and provides information about whether an individual is employed, 
unemployed or out of the labour force. The estimating sample is restricted to individuals 
aged 15 and higher (i.e. we ignore child labour as defined by ILO).
8 This restricts the 
sample to 18979 individuals who are classified as actively participating (or are seeking to 
participate) in the labour force.
9 In this sample, 12394 (66%) are males and 6585 (34%) 
are females. Out of this sample, 5951 males and 2368 females reside in urban areas, 
while 6443 males and 4217 females reside in rural areas. 
Finally in estimating the wage equation, we drop the unemployed individuals 
whose wage rates are not observed.
10 This restricts the sample to 18237 individuals. The 
sample consists of 11919 are males. 7875 individuals reside in urban areas, of which 72% 
are males. Males constitute 60% of the total rural sample of 10362.   
In the wage regressions the dependent variable is the (log) of hourly wages. We 
focus on four classes of workers: the self-employed, wage employees, casual workers, 
                                                 
8 The upper boundary of the working age group is higher than the conventional retirement age of 60. This is 
because in rural areas individuals tend to work beyond the official retirement age. 
9 Thus, individuals below 15 years of age and those permanently not in the labour force (the retired, 
disabled, and full time students) are excluded from the sample. 
10 To avoid the problem of taking logarithm of zero in the wage equation and to ensure consistency between 




and unpaid family workers to obtain as complete a population coverage as possible.  The 
(log) of hourly wages is obtained by dividing monthly wages by the imputed monthly 
hours of work.  
The set of explanatory variables includes variables that measure individual 
productivity (this is unobserved and we use the individual’s educational attainment, age 
and the square of age
11 as proxies);  monthly hours worked
12, the number of months 
unemployed
13, dummies for being married, job status
14, training and skill
15. We also 
control for occupation and industry.  
To identify the selection term’s parameters in the employment equation, there 
must be a variable in this equation, which influences the probability of employment but 
not the wage rate. Generally, all the variables that affect wages cannot enter the 
employment status equation, since some of these are unobservable for the non-workers.  
We include asset ownership (an indirect proxy for non-labour income), home ownership 
status to proxy wealth, and some family status variables as identifying variables.
16 While 
                                                 
11 We do not have any information on actual labour market experience. Age is used as the approximate 
variable for general labour market experience. Moreover, as age increases, productivity and wage rates tend 
to rise. But further increases in age may lead to a decline in wage rates and productivity because of 
diminishing marginal returns. To capture the concavity of the wage profile a quadratic age term is included. 
12 The aim in including this variable is to assess the gross elasticity of hours worked per month with respect 
to wage rates. A negative impact of this variable on wage rates is often observed, which virtually reflects 
the predominance of income effects over substitution effects on returns per hour of work. 
13 It has been hypothesized that time out of the labour force can result in depreciation of human capital and 
therefore, depresses wage rates depending on whether an individual has experienced a long spell or a short 
spell of unemployment (Mincer and Polachek (1974)). 
14 The determination of job status is independent of occupation and industry classification but refers to the 
same job.  
15 In general skills and training may be highly, if not perfectly correlated. Skilled people usually tend to 
have training. In our case, we do not find perfect multicollinearity between skills and training. If 
multicollinearity is less than perfect or very high (i.e. near multicollinearity), the OLS estimators still retain 
the unbiased property. Because near multicollinearity per se does not violate the other assumptions of OLS 
estimation. 
16 One of the major drawbacks in our dataset is that we do not have information on pre-school age children, 
which would not only be a deterrent to women entering the labour force but also influence their 




these variables are unlikely to affect wages directly they are likely to affect employment 
status: for example the ownership of various types of assets could reduce the probability 
of employment by raising the shadow value of a person’s time in non-market activities. 
    Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the 
selection and the wage equations separately for the urban and rural sample. We also 
present t-tests for gender differences. The following results are worth noting: Females are 
on average younger (AGE) and are generally less educated than males. Gaps in 
educational attainment between males and females are significant in all levels of 
education except for primary education (PRIM) in urban areas. A higher proportion of 
female participants are married compared to males in rural areas. This is quite a common 
scenario in rural Bangladesh where adult male members of the household migrate to 
urban areas but are unable to bring their family with them or due to adverse economic 
situations married female members are forced to assume wage employment outside 
home. Women are more likely to own assets like sewing machines, shallow machines and 
tractors (ASST03) compared to men, though men are more likely to own larger assets   
In the urban sample, the log wage gap at the mean is 0.6703. That is, on average, 
women earn 95% less per hour than men.
17 The difference is statistically significant at the 
1% level. In the rural sample, the mean log wage difference for men and women is 
0.3551 at the 1% significance level. In percentage terms, on average, women earn 43% 
less than men in rural areas.
 18 Finally women are predominantly employed in agriculture 
                                                 
17 The figure is derived from exp (0.6703)-1. It is also worth noting that the gender wage differential in our 
urban data is significantly larger than that found using similar methodologies in other studies: Loureiro, 
Carneiro and Sachsida (2004) find 20% and 61% gap in the urban labour market of Brazil in 1992 and 
1998, respectively, while Ashraf and Ashraf (1993) find a 61.14 % gap in Rawalpindi City, Pakistan.  




(OCCUP_AGRI) and services (OCCUP_SER), while men dominate sales 
(OCCUP_SALES), and production (OCCUP_PROD) related occupations.  
In figures 1 and 2, we present the kernel density estimates of the log of hourly 
wages for males and females for the urban sample (Figure 1) and the rural sample (Figure 
2). In general, the peak of the distribution of male (log) hourly wages lies to the right of 
the distribution of the female (log) hourly wages. The distribution of hourly wages looks 
different for males and females and indeed using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test for 
the equality of distributions we see that indeed they are: using the K-S test the null 
hypothesis of equality of distribution is always rejected (in every case the p-values is 
0.000). 
 
4 Empirical Results 
Given that we argue, and the regression results presented agree, that ignoring selection 
bias could result in biased estimates; we focus our discussion on the selectivity corrected 
regression results. We start with a discussion of the selection equation and then turn to 
the selectivity corrected wage regressions. The uncorrected wage regression results are 
presented in the appendix.  
Probit Results for Participation Status 
The selection (employment) equation is estimated using a probit regression model, where 
the dependant variable PART takes the value of 1 if the worker is employed and 0 if the 
worker is unemployed. Separate regressions are estimated for males and females. We 




Age (AGE) has a positive and statistically significant effect on the employment 
probabilities of males and females across all samples. The square of the age of the 
individual (AGESQ) however has a negative and statistically significant suggesting that 
the probability of employment increases with age but at a decreasing rate for females in 
both samples and for males in the urban sample. Further, being married (MARRIED) has 
a stronger effect on the probability of employment of women compared to that of men. 
This might be a reflection of household budget constraints that force married women to 
enter the labour force in order to support their families. The marginal effects coefficient 
estimates of the educational attainment dummies are always negative, statistically 
significant and are monotonically decreasing. For example for the urban sample, males 
with primary schooling have a 2 percentage point lower probability of participating in the 
labour market compared to men with no schooling (the omitted category). This 
probability increases to 4.65 percentage points if the highest education attained is level 6 
– 10 and rises further to 9.54 percentage points if the highest education attained is 
SSC/HSC or equivalent and to 9.81 percentage points if the individual has attained a 
graduate or higher degree. The corresponding probabilities for the sample of urban 
females are 3.39, 6.66, 10.70 and 10.05. The results are consistent with those reported by 
Ashraf and Ashraf (1993). 
The effects of wealth on the probability of employment are measured by non-
labour income like ownership of assets. Asset ownership generally has a statistically 
significant effect on probability of male participation status, but not on the participation 
status of females. In the urban sample, for both males and females, the probability of 




who own the house they reside in. This result is surprisingly similar to what is typically 
found for developed countries. For example, Kidd and Viney (1991)  using data from 
Australia report that the probability of participation in the labour market increases for 
women, if they live in a rented accommodation. On the other hand, it is surprising that 
residing in a rented accommodation has a negative and statistically significant impact on 
male’s employment in the rural sample. In the case of men, it might be capturing the fact 
that in the rural sample those individuals working are also those more likely to own a 
home. Págán (2002) has identified a similar association in rural Guatemala, where 
owning the house where the person resides has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on employment probabilities for males. 
Results from the Selectivity Corrected Wage Regression: 
The estimated wage equations corrected for selection bias are reported next for males and 
females separately for the rural and the urban sample in Table 3. Wage rates increase 
with years of experience but the relationship is concave. In the urban sample wage rates 
peak at age 59 for males and at age 43 for females. The corresponding numbers for the 
rural sample are 46 and 29 respectively. 
  The estimated rates of return to educational attainment increase monotonically           
for both men and women. However, it is interesting to note that the returns to education 
for females are the highest for women residing in urban areas.  This result is possibly 
attributable to sectoral differences in labour market opportunities as well as differences in 
productivity that provide higher wage rates for women with more educational attainment. 
Training appears to have a stronger role to play in the wage determination of women 




The wage rates of self-employed males and females (SELF_EMPD), of wage 
employees (W_EMPD), and of casual workers (C_WKR) in the urban sample are 
positive and statistically significantly different from the wage rate of the reference group 
(i.e. unpaid family workers). However, we find a similar result in the rural sample except 
for the female wage employee. Although in all specifications the coefficients for males 
are larger than for females, gender differences are well pronounced in self-employment 
(SELF_EMPD) in both the rural and the urban samples. One possible explanation for the 
observed difference is that males who select into self-employment are generally endowed 
with higher levels of education (i.e. some secondary and post secondary education) 
compared to females and accordingly, have a greater propensity to be successful in the 
labour market.  
  Being married (MARRIED) significantly reduces female wage rates in the rural 
sample. One explanation could be that married women impose higher costs of 
employment via maternity leave entitlements.  On the other hand, marriage (MARRIED) 
leads to an increase in men’s wage rates above the reference group in the urban sample, 
whereas MARRIED becomes statistically insignificant for males in the rural sample. 
  Finally it is worth noting that  λ is always negative and statistically significant for 
males. It implies that employed men earn no more than would have the average 
individual in the sample of employed and unemployed population.
19 On the other hand, 
                                                 
19 A number of studies have used the Heckman (1979) estimator, but the estimates of the coefficient on the 
λ variable in the male wage equation differ considerably: Miller and Rummery (1991) report a significant, 




the coefficient for λ (inverse mills ratio) in the regression for females is negative and 




Decomposition of the Wage Differential 
Next we turn to the decomposition results. First, we report decompositions of the wage 
differential, unadjusted for sample selection bias. The decomposition of the wage 
differential, adjusted for sample selection bias is reported next. 
  The decomposition of unadjusted estimates (Table 4) reveals that the wage 
differential between males and females in the urban sample when males are the baseline 
(Equation 2) is 67.03 percentage points. The decomposition of this gender gap shows that 
the explained proportion is smaller in magnitude than the discriminatory proportion of the 
gender wage differential. After accounting for differences in productive characteristics 
(the explained proportion), an adjusted wage gap (or the discriminatory component) 
remains 48.51 percentage points or 72%. The difference in the explained component is 
18.52 percentage points is in favour of males. In other words, 28% of the differential is 
due to superior endowments of the typical male. However, using the female wage 
structure as the non-discriminatory norm (Equation 3) results in discriminatory 
component of 59.14 percentage points, or 88%, leaving an explained component of 7.89 
percentage points, or 12%. The Blinder (1973) decomposition results obtained from the 
two baselines in fact suggest that a large fraction of the wage gap between men and 
                                                 
20 Ashraf and Ashraf (1993) report similar findings. The insignificant result of the sample selection variable 
λ in the female sample implies that working women are representative of the population of all women. 
Ermisch and Wright (1994) argue that a negative coefficient on λ in the female sample is very plausible 
when a woman’s reservation and offered wages are positively correlated, and this is likely because women 
who are more productive in jobs also tend to be more productive in home activities.  




women is not explained by differences in the accumulation of productive differences and 
discrimination is even larger when the female rather than the male structure is used as the 
competitive standard.
21 However, the Cotton (1988) decomposition analysis (Equation 4) 
provides similar results with discrimination and productivity differences (explained 
component) accounting respectively for 77% [i.e., (0.4973+1.2020-1.1845) =0.5148 or 
51.48 percentage points] and 23% of the differential. The implication here is that 
discrimination is playing a role in the determination of wage rates and the major 
contribution is attributed to female disadvantages in the urban labour market. 
In the rural sample (Table 5), when the male wage structure is the baseline 
(Equation 2), the explained and discriminatory components of the gender wage 
differential are 0.2019 percentage points, or 57%, and 0.1532 percentage points, or 43%, 
respectively.  The results imply that discrimination against women is small in magnitude. 
There is however a large difference between men and women in terms of the components 
of characteristics (explained proportion). While using the female wage structure as the 
standard baseline (Equation 3), the decomposition reveals that the differences in 
productivity characteristics serve to reduce rather than widen the wage gap. However, 
after controlling for productivity-related factors, the adjusted wage gap remains 74.52 
percentage points [i.e. (0.3551+0.3901) = 0.7452], which is attributed to gender-based 
labour market discrimination. Using the Cotton (1988) approach we find that 
discrimination against women (combining the ‘male advantage’, the ‘female 
disadvantage’ and the ‘differences in constants’) is relatively low at 39.01 percentage 
points. 
                                                 




  Controlling for sample selection factor in wage equations for rural and urban 
samples reveals that the wage offer differential is higher than the observed wage 
differential because of the difference in the average selectivity bias between males and 
females (Tables 4 and 5, columns 4 and 5). Although the percentage contribution of the 
difference in the selectivity bias is very small, the addition of the term to the observed 
wage gap indicates that if the wage equation is not adjusted for sample selection bias, the 
extent of the wage differential will be underestimated. 
  In the urban sample, irrespective of weights, the results provide evidence of 
significant discrimination that accounts for between 73% and 89% of the wage offer 
differential. In the rural sample except for the male base line, the male-female wage offer 
differential largely attributable to discrimination rather than any endowment effect. 
However it is worth noting that the wage gap due to differences in productivity 
(explained component) is negative when the female wage structure is used as the baseline 
(Equation 10). It implies that if female characteristics are comparable to the male 
characteristics but rewarded according to the female wage structure in the labour market, 
then the wage gap is reduced significantly. 
 
5 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper analyses the determinants of employment decisions and (log) of hourly wages 
(adjusted and unadjusted for selectivity bias). It also decomposes the gender wage gap in 
rural and urban labour markets of Bangladesh using individual level unit record data from 
the LFS 1999 – 2000. Our decomposition indicates that considerable gap exists between 




much of it is directly attributable to discrimination. We also find out that discrimination 
is larger and the productivity difference is smaller in magnitude when the female rather 
than the male wage structure is used as the competitive standard – a clear presence of the 
“Index number problem”. On the other hand, the results using the Cotton (1998) 
decomposition method suggests that the largest component of the unexplained wage gap 
in both samples comes from females being disadvantaged. Therefore, discrimination 
against women is more prevalent compared to nepotism towards men in explaining the 
wage gap. Correcting for sample selection bias leads to a significant increase in the 
gender wage gap in both rural and urban areas, and is an important contributor to the total 
discrimination component. The implication of this result is that the extent of male-female 
wage gap is likely to be understated if selection bias effects are ignored in the wage 
equations. 
The main policy implications of the analysis is that probably the most fruitful 
approach to raising the earnings of women to be on a par with the men is an emphasis on 
skill development. Our results show that education is particularly crucial. It is also 
revealed that there is a marked gender disparity in enrolment at secondary level, post 
secondary level as well as tertiary level. Therefore, targeted efforts need to be made 
towards encouraging and supporting women to enter and remain in these sectors. Our 
results also suggest the need for affirmative government actions that persuade firms to 
employ women on comparative work policies. Additionally, in order to implement 
legislative and public policy changes there appears to be a strong requirement for gender-
conscious planning. 
 















Figure 1: The Distribution of Hourly Wages for Males and Females 






Figure 2: The Distribution of Hourly Wages for Males and Females 
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Table 1 Mean Values of Variables Used in Estimation 
Variable     Urban  Sample       Rural  Sample 
    ______________________________________________________________________________ 
         Males       Females     t-test             Males                Females     t-test 
                                   for difference                                   for difference 
LNHRSINC 2.6206 1.9503 -31.13 *** 2.2744 1.9193 -23.16 ***
(0.8706) (0.8322) (0.8292) (0.6489)
LN_MHRS 5.2805 4.7458 -51.51 *** 5.2220 4.5172
(0.3286) (0.5782) (0.3363) (0.4903) -86.77 ***
AGE 35.6194 31.4759 -14.18 *** 36.2339 33.0868 -11.75 ***
(12.3258) (11.236) (14.3398) (12.1557)
AGESQ 14.2064 11.1693 -13.43 *** 15.1849 12.4246 -12.76 ***
(9.6394) (8.4092) (11.836) (9.362)
UNEMPS 0.0347 0.0045 -1.45 0.0155 0.0154 -0.01
(0.9757) (0.0948) (0.6582) (0.5871)
PRIM 0.2106 0.2226 1.2 0.2696 0.2407 -3.34 ***
(0.4077) (0.4160) (0.4438) (0.4276)
SECOND 0.2526 0.1943 -5.66 *** 0.1785 0.1077 -10.05 ***
(0.4345) (0.3957) (0.3830) (0.3100)
PSECON 0.1617 0.0938 -8.03 *** 0.0695 0.0313 -8.54 ***
(0.3682) (0.2915) (0.2544) (0.1742)
GRAD 0.1207 0.0448 -10.52 *** 0.0244 0.0055 -7.43 ***
(0.3257) (0.2068) (0.1542) (0.0737)
TRA_VOC 0.0097 0.006754 -1.27 0.0069 0.0037 -2.14 **
(0.0982) (0.0819) (0.0826) (0.0604)
TRA_TECH 0.0248 0.0077 -4.89 *** 0.0043 0.0002 -3.9 ***
(0.1554) (0.0872) (0.0655) (0.0156)  
 
     
 
 
Table 1 Continued 
Variable     Urban  Sample       Rural  Sample 
    ______________________________________________________________________________ 
         Males       Females     t-test             Males                Females     t-test 
                                   for difference                                   for difference 
TRA_GEN 0.0207 0.0153 -1.57 0.0137 0.0085 -2.4 **
(0.1424) (0.1228) (0.1164) (0.0920)
SKIL 0.3405 0.1175 -20.4 *** 0.3673 0.0886 -33.4 ***
(0.4739) (0.3221) (0.4821) (0.2842)
MARRIED 0.7525 0.7466 -0.56 0.7624 0.8461 10.53 ***
(0.4316) (0.4350) (0.4257) (0.3609)
ASST01 0.2242 0.1765 -4.82 *** 0.1083 0.092 -2.73 ***
(0.4171) (0.3813) (0.3108) (0.2891)
ASST02 0.0413 0.0346 -1.42 0.047 0.0424 -1.11
(0.1991) (0.1829) (0.2117) (0.2016)
ASST03 0.5579 0.5954 0.97 0.8237 0.9134 2.4 **
(1.5744) (1.6198) (1.8546) (1.9319)
HRENT 0.3917 0.3454 -3.93 *** 0.011 0.0095 -0.76
(0.4882) (0.4756) (0.1044) (0.0969)
HFREE 0.0363 0.0401 0.83 0.0194 0.0204 0.36
(0.1870) (0.1963) (0.1379) (0.1414)
NMEN 1.6801 1.261 -18.23 *** 1.6485 1.3353 -17.63 ***
(0.9828) (0.8472) (0.9303) (0.8430)
NFEM 0.5135 1.2829 49.03 *** 0.91 1.3427 31.33 ***
(0.6647) (0.5822) (0.7280) (0.6472)
OLD01 0.0422 0.0418 -0.08 0.0897 0.0714 -3.37 ***
(0.2010) (0.2002) (0.2858) (0.2575)
OLD02 0.0049 0.0152 4.83 *** 0.0107 0.0225 4.85 ***
(0.0696) (0.1224) (0.1029) (0.1484)  
     
 
 
Table 1 Continued 
Variable     Urban  Sample       Rural  Sample 
    ______________________________________________________________________________ 
         Males       Females     t-test             Males                Females     t-test 
                                   for difference                                   for difference 
MALE_HHEAD 0.9178 0.8045 -14.85 *** 0.9393 0.8802 -10.81 ***
(0.2746) (0.3967) (0.2388) (0.3247)
FEMALE_HHEAD 0.0155 0.1136 20.31 *** 0.0166 0.0669 13.65 ***
(0.1234) (0.3174) (0.1278) (0.2498)
OCCUP_PROF 0.0212 0.0041 -5.41 *** 0.0011 0.0002 -1.57
(0.1441) (0.0635) (0.0334) (0.0156)
OCCUP_CLERIC 0.0875 0.0257 -9.74 *** 0.0193 0.0037 -6.86 ***
(0.2827) (0.1582) (0.1376) (0.0604)
OCCUP_SALES 0.2890 0.0459 -24.27 *** 0.1346 0.0188 -20.67 ***
(0.4533) (0.2094) (0.3413) (0.1358)
OCCUP_SER 0.0624 0.160738 13.87 *** 0.0233 0.0488 7.08 ***
(0.2420) (0.3674) (0.1509) (0.2155)
OCCUP_AGRI 0.1197 0.3661 26.18 *** 0.6428 0.8511 23.85 ***
(0.3247) (0.4818) (0.4792) (0.3560)
OCCUP_PROD 0.3601 0.3206 -3.31 *** 0.1481 0.0659 -12.9 ***
(0.4801) (0.4668) (0.3553) (0.2481)
INDS_MANU 0.2045 0.2188 1.41 0.0838 0.0630 -3.92 ***
(0.4033) (0.4135) (0.2771) (0.2429)
INDS_WHRET 0.2757 0.0486 -22.93 *** 0.1326 0.0200 -20.16 ***
(0.4469) (0.2151) (0.3392) (0.1401)
INDS_HOTEL 0.0269 0.008105 -5.17 *** 0.0120 0.0012 -6.12 ***
(0.1618) (0.0897) (0.1088) (0.0349)
INDS_COMMU 0.1498 0.0086 -18.41 *** 0.0528 0.0017 -14.47 ***
(0.3569) (0.0921) (0.2237) (0.0413)  
 
     
 
 
Table 1 Continued 
Variable     Urban  Sample       Rural  Sample 
    ______________________________________________________________________________ 
         Males       Females     t-test             Males                Females     t-test 
                                   for difference                                   for difference 
INDS_FINST 0.0200 0.0041 -5.16 *** 0.0029 0.0005 -2.71 ***
(0.1400) (0.0635) (0.0535) (0.0221)
INDS_REALEST 0.0090 0.0041 -2.28 ** 0.0019 0.0005 -1.93 *
(0.0946) (0.0635) (0.0437) (0.0221)
INDS_PUBADMN 0.0591 0.0225 -6.8 *** 0.0115 0.0007 -6.33 ***
(0.2358) (0.1484) (0.1066) (0.0271)
INDS_HLTH 0.1028 0.2688 19 *** 0.0327 0.0552 5.6 ***
(0.3037) (0.4434) (0.1779) (0.2283)
INDS_EDU 0.0264 0.0531 5.92 *** 0.0239 0.0071 -6.45 ***
(0.1602) (0.2243) (0.1529) (0.0838)  
See Table AI for definition of variables. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% . Standard deviations reported in parentheses. 











Table 2 Estimates of Selection Equations: LFS 1999 – 2000  
(Dependent Variable: Binary variable of employment in the labour force) 
Variable      Urban Sample             Rural Sample 
         _________________________________________________________ 
              Males            Females      Males                  Females 
                           Coef      M.E.
a       Coef      M.E.
a                   Coef   M.E.
a               Coef   M.E.
a 
AGE 0.0716 0.0023 *** 0.1018 0.0050 *** 0.0762 0.0012 *** 0.1198 0.0022 ***
(0.0178) (0.0250) (0.0255) (0.0180)
AGESQ -0.0007 0.0000 *** -0.0008 0.0000 ** -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0000 ***
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002)
PRIM -0.4617 -0.0203 *** -0.5053 -0.0339 *** -0.3349 -0.0065 *** -0.2530 -0.0054 *
(0.1564) (0.1500) (0.1092) (0.1341)
SECOND -0.8503 -0.0465 *** -0.7962 -0.0666 *** -0.4957 -0.0119 *** -0.4928 -0.0147 ***
(0.1435) (0.1417) (0.1139) (0.1431)
PSECOND -1.1716 -0.0954 *** -0.9766 -0.1070 *** -0.9242 -0.0412 *** -0.9147 -0.0485 ***
(0.1511) (0.1629) (0.1357) (0.1792)
GRAD -1.1412 -0.0981 *** -0.9038 -0.1005 *** -0.9276 -0.0451 *** -1.2336 -0.0971 ***
(0.1622) (0.2238) (0.2082) (0.3467)
MARRIED 0.9459 0.0557 *** 0.7393 0.0551 *** 0.4312 0.0092 *** 0.8628 0.0349 ***
(0.1077) (0.1169) (0.1281) (0.1136)
ASST01 0.2833 0.0077 *** 0.0736 0.0035 0.2172 0.0027 * -0.0211 -0.0004
(0.0840) (0.1254) (0.1309) (0.1666)
ASST02 0.5587 0.0104 ** -0.3217 -0.0216 0.1869 0.0023 0.2920 0.0038
(0.2355) (0.2607) (0.2082) (0.3106)
ASST03 -0.0032 -0.0001 0.0105 0.0005 0.0159 0.0002 0.0288 0.0005
(0.0202) (0.0321) (0.0212) (0.0271)
HRENT 0.2922 0.0088 *** 0.4236 0.0188 *** -0.5570 -0.0176 * -0.5064 -0.0171
(0.0806) (0.1187) (0.3078) (0.3648)
HFREE -0.0587 -0.0020 -0.0236 -0.0012 0.1207 0.0016 0.3156 0.0039
(0.1886) (0.2718) (0.3700) (0.5189)
NMEN (b) -0.1111 -0.0055 * (b) -0.1120 -0.0020 **
(0.0575) (0.0552)
NFEM -0.1591 -0.0051 *** (b) -0.0199 -0.0003 (b)
(0.0479) (0.0514)
OLD01 -0.0725 -0.0025 0.0987 0.0045 -0.2410 -0.0048 * -0.1174 -0.0024
(0.1621) (0.2312) (0.1287) (0.1896)
OLD02 0.6197 0.0103 0.3279 0.0118 -0.2448 -0.0052 -0.4439 -0.0137
(0.5525) (0.6094) (0.2932) (0.3401)
MALE_HHEAD 0.3258 0.0142 *** 0.1026 0.0054 0.2249 0.0045 * 0.1756 0.0037
(0.0925) (0.1543) (0.1287) (0.1745)
FEMALE_HHEAD 0.2821 0.0067 0.3167 0.0123 0.5319 0.0045 ** 0.0412 0.0007
(0.2257) (0.2437) (0.2683) (0.2391)  
No. of Observations   5951                     2368                              6443                       4217 
aM.E. = the marginal effect for dummy variables is computed as dF/dx as x changes from 0 to 1, holding 
the other explanatory variables at their sample means. 
bvariable not included.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% . 
 
Table 3 Selectivity Adjusted Estimates of Wage Equations: LFS 1999 – 2000  




Variable       Urban Sample                         Rural Sample 
         _________________________________________________________ 
                 Males           Females        Males              Females 
       Coef    Coef         Coef       Coef 
Constant 4.2340 *** 5.3172 *** 5.0638 *** 6.5943 ***
(0.1740) (0.2594) (0.1648) (0.1516)
LN_MHRS -0.7536 *** -0.7008 *** -0.8569 *** -0.9379 ***
(0.0266) (0.0335) (0.0236) (0.0162)
AGE 0.04739 *** 0.0173 ** 0.0277 *** 0.0058
(0.0048) (0.0072) (0.0039) (0.0036)
AGESQ -0.0004 *** -0.0002 ** -0.0003 *** -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
UNEMPS 0.0087 0.1123 0.0036 0.0016
(0.0085) (0.1498) (0.0118) (0.0122)
TRA_VOC -0.033 0.1258 0.0323 0.0514
(0.0851) (0.1738) (0.0905) (0.1193)
TRA_GEN 0.1815 *** 0.4233 *** -0.1743 *** 0.1851 **
(0.0596) (0.1173) (0.0664) (0.0805)
TRA_TECH 0.1268 ** 0.4562 *** -0.0271 -0.0615
(0.0558) (0.1650) (0.1153) (0.4610)
SELF_EMPD 1.1726 *** 0.1316 ** 1.2462 *** 0.3638 ***
(0.0383) (0.0583) (0.0282) (0.0294)
W_EMPD 0.9464 *** 0.3835 *** 0.9085 *** 0.0408
(0.0410) (0.0643) (0.0377) (0.0501)
C_WKR 0.5466 *** 0.1089 * 0.5366 *** 0.1034 ***
(0.0441) (0.0635) (0.0287) (0.0304)
PRIM 0.1350 *** 0.1129 *** 0.1328 *** 0.0006
(0.0251) (0.0387) (0.0200) (0.0178)
SECOND 0.2891 *** 0.1205 *** 0.2617 *** 0.0211
(0.0266) (0.0461) (0.0244) (0.0263)
PSECON 0.5423 *** 0.1812 *** 0.4307 *** 0.1092 **
0.0329) (0.0679) (0.0399) (0.0544)
GRAD 0.8128 *** 0.6540 *** 0.6538 *** 0.2961 **
(0.0389) (0.0935) (0.0613) (0.1172)
OCCUP_PROF 0.0167 0.4946 * 0.1043 0.6014
(0.0745) (0.2829) (0.2398) (0.4717)
OCCUP_CLERIC -0.1122 ** -0.1033 0.1106 0.2937 **
(0.0505) (0.1256) (0.0858) (0.1468)
OCCUP_SALES -0.0369 -0.1578 0.1348 -0.4616 ***
(0.0538) (0.1496) (0.0882) (0.1516)  
 
         
                   





Variable         Urban Sample                 Rural Sample 
         _________________________________________________________ 
                 Males           Females          Males          Females 
        Coef    Coef            Coef    Coef 
OCCUP_SER -0.297 *** -0.8834 *** -0.0457 -0.7535 ***
(0.0572) (0.1074) (0.0905) (0.1139)
OCCUP_AGRI -0.0507 -0.6039 *** 0.0106 -0.55 ***
(0.0742) (0.1375) (0.0833) (0.1030)
OCCUP_PROD -0.1503 *** -0.4872 *** 0.1627 ** -0.7077 ***
(0.0491) (0.1009) (0.0789) (0.1121)
INDS_MANU 0.1520 ** -0.1475 -0.1030 * 0.1223 *
(0.0632) (0.1133) (0.0533) (0.0724)
INDS_WHRET 0.0622 -0.1160 -0.1076 * -0.0648
(0.0632) (0.1498) (0.0593) (0.1171)
INDS_HOTEL 0.0614 0.2245 0.0692 -0.5543 **
(0.0808) (0.1917) (0.0938) (0.2224)
INDS_COMMU 0.0614 0.4431 ** -0.2330 *** 0.5512 ***
(0.0642) (0.1886) (0.0600) (0.1892)
INDS_FINST 0.2859 *** 0.4176 0.2157 0.9923 ***
(0.0900) (0.2897) (0.1588) (0.3388)
INDS_REALEST 0.1622 0.4074 0.2508 1.2897 ***
(0.1061) (0.2487) (0.1753) (0.3349)
INDS_PUBADMN 0.1964 *** 0.4519 *** 0.2282 ** 1.4542 ***
(0.0719) (0.1518) (0.0906) (0.2803)
INDS_HLTH 0.09111 -0.1302 -0.0730 0.0951
(0.0640) (0.1084) (0.0646) (0.0819)
INDS_EDU -0.1298 -0.3965 *** 0.0646 -0.076
(0.0849) (0.1455) (0.0930) (0.1319)
SKIL 0.1553 *** 0.1788 *** 0.1799 *** 0.0595 **
(0.0190) (0.0471) (0.0171) (0.0262)
MARRIED 0.0854 ** -0.0765 0.0123 -0.0787 ***
(0.0390) (0.0470) (0.0333) (0.0296)
             -0.3724 *** -0.0919 -0.6218 *** -0.0206
(0.1251) (0.1824) (0.1900) (0.1349)
λ
 
No. of observations         5654               2221           6265                 4097 
Wald Chi-squared        5092.46           1456.52           6317.47  4362.34 
Standard errors in parentheses. 





Table 4 Decomposition of the Gender Wage Differential (Urban Sample) 




   ______________________________________________________
                (1)        (2)         (3)                        (4)               (5)         
  
Differences in Observed Wages   0.6703  0.6703   0.6703            0.6703       0.6703   
Differences in Adjusted wages     0.4851  0.5914   0.5148                na           na 
Differences in Selection Bias           na        na          na            0.0206        0.0206 
Differences in Offered Wages          na        na           na                  0.6909        0.6909 
Contribution of Characteristics 
 
LN_MHRS   -0.4024  -0.3744   -0.3946       -0.4029     -0.3747       
AGE    0.2092    0.0785     0.1726   0.1939         0.0709 
AGESQ   -0.1475  -0.0629    -0.1238       -0.1358       -0.0577 
UNEMPS                                        0.0003    0.0033     1.10E-03     0.0003        0.0034 
EDUCATION    0.1093    0.0659     0.0971        0.1162         0.0683 
SKIL    0.0352    0.0403     0.0366        0.0346         0.0399 
TRAINING              0.0030    0.0105     0.0051        0.0030         0.0105 
MARRIED              0.0016   -0.0006     0.0009        0.0009       -0.0008 
JOB STATUS             0.3313    0.0381     0.2493        0.3313         0.0381 
OCCUPATION            0.0204    0.1802     0.0652        0.0201         0.1800 
INDUSTRY              0.0248    0.1000     0.0460        0.0228         0.0999 
Total                 0.1852    0.0789     0.1555        0.1844         0.0778 
                 (28%)      (12%)     (23%)         (27%)          (11%) 
Discrimination            0.4851    0.5914     0.5148        0.5065         0.6131 
                (72%)       (88%)     (77%)         (73%)          (89%) 
Male  Advantage            0.4973 
Female Disadvantage                                                    1.2020 
Differences in constants                                               -1.1845 
 Columns (1) and (4) show the result from Blinder Approach and use the male wage structure as the non-
discriminatory norm, whereas columns (2) and (5) use the female wage structure as the non-discriminatory 
following the Blinder Approach. 
 Column (3) describes the decomposition using the Cotton Approach. Total discriminatory component is 
the sum of the components attributable to the differences in constant terms, the male advantage and the 
female disadvantage. 
The following explanatory variables are included in each group. Education: PRIM, SECOND, PSECON, 
GRAD. Training: TRA_VOC, TRA_GEN, TRA_TECH. Job Status: SELF_EMPD, W_EMPD, C_WKR. 
Occupation: OCCUP_PROF, OCCUP_CLERIC, OCCUP_SALES, OCCUP_SER, OCCUP_AGRI, 
OCCUP_PROD. Industry: INDS_MANU, INDS_WHRET, INDS_HOTEL, INDS_COMMU, 
INDS_FINST, INDS_REALEST, INDS_PUBADMN, INDS_HLTH, INDS_EDU. 








Table 5 Decomposition of the Gender Wage Differential (Rural Sample) 




   ______________________________________________________
                (1)        (2)         (3)                        (4)               (5)         
  
Differences in Observed Wages   0.3551  0.3551   0.3551            0.3551       0.3551   
Differences in Adjusted wages     0.1532  0.7452   0.3901                na           na 
Differences in Selection Bias           na        na          na            0.0304        0.0304 
Differences in Offered Wages          na        na           na                  0.3855        0.3855 
Contribution of Characteristics 
 
LN_MHRS   -0.6015  -0.6609    -0.6252      -0.6039    -0.6610       
AGE    0.1076    0.0199     0.0725   0.0901        0.0189 
AGESQ   -0.0863   -0.0182   -0.0590       -0.0719      -0.0172 
UNEMPS                                       3.60E-05 1.73E-07 2.85E-07    3.80E-08    1.71E-09 
EDUCATION    0.0471    0.0112     0.0327        0.0524        0.0115 
SKIL    0.0505    0.0166     0.0369        0.0501        0.0166 
TRAINING             -0.0008    0.0008    -0.0002      -0.0009        0.0009 
MARRIED             -0.0055    0.0063    -0.0008      -0.0010        0.0065 
JOB STATUS             0.6796    0.1730     0.4769        0.6752        0.1725 
OCCUPATION            0.0302    0.0272     0.0290        0.0298        0.0273 
INDUSTRY             -0.0190    0.0340     0.0022       -0.0193       0.0339 
Total                 0.2019   -0.3901   -0.0350         0.2006      -0.3899 
                 (57%)   (-109%)   (-0.09%)        (52%)      (-101%) 
Discrimination            0.1532    0.7452     0.3901        0.1849        0.7754 
                 (43%)     (209%)   (109%)         (48%)        (201%) 
Male  Advantage            0.9852 
Female Disadvantage                                                    1.1226 
Differences in constants                                               -1.7177 
Columns (1) and (4) show the result from Blinder Approach and use the male wage structure as the non-
discriminatory norm, whereas columns (2) and (5) use the female wage structure as the non-discriminatory 
following the Blinder Approach. 
Column (3) describes the decomposition using the Cotton Approach. Total discriminatory component is 
the sum of the components attributable to the differences in constant terms, the male advantage and the 
female disadvantage. 
The following explanatory variables are included in each group. Education: PRIM, SECOND, PSECON, 
GRAD. Training: TRA_VOC, TRA_GEN, TRA_TECH. Job Status: SELF_EMPD, W_EMPD, C_WKR. 
Occupation: OCCUP_PROF, OCCUP_CLERIC, OCCUP_SALES, OCCUP_SER, OCCUP_AGRI, 
OCCUP_PROD. Industry: INDS_MANU, INDS_WHRET, INDS_HOTEL, INDS_COMMU, 
INDS_FINST, INDS_REALEST, INDS_PUBADMN, INDS_HLTH, INDS_EDU. 






Table AI. Definition of Variables 








LNHRSINC    = Log of hourly wages 
PART     = 1 if individual is employed; 




   
LN_MHRS   = Log of monthly hours worked 
Age 
AGE  = Age of individual measured in months 
AGESQ    = Age of individual squared 
Education 
PRIM  = 1 if individual is between level 1-5 
 =  0  otherwise 
SECOND   = 1 if individual is between level 6-10 
 =  0  otherwise 
PSECON  = 1 if individual attains SSC/HSC
i and equivalent. 
 =  0  otherwise 
GRAD  = 1 if individual attains graduate or higher degree 
 =  0  otherwise 
Marital Status 
MARRIED    = 1 if individual is married  
    = 0 otherwise 
Occupation 
OCCUP_PROF       = 1 if occupation category is professional/technical; = 0  
          otherwise 
OCCUP_CLERIC       = 1 if occupation category is clerical; = 0 otherwise 
OCCUP_SALES         = 1 if occupation category is sales; = 0 otherwise 
OCCUP_SER  = 1 if occupation category is service; = 0 otherwise 
OCCUP_AGRI    = 1 if occupation category is agriculture; = 0 otherwise 
OCCUP_PROD     = 1 if occupation category is production, transport labourers   
        and others; = 0 otherwise  
Industry 
INDS_MANU   = 1 if industry category is manufacturing (including mining  
         and quarrying; electricity, gas and water supply and  
         construction); = 0 otherwise 
INDS_HLTH    = 1 if industry category is health and social work; = 0otherwise 
INDS_PUBADMN   = 1 if industry category is public administration; = 0 otherwise 
INDS_COMMU  = 1 if industry category is transport, storage and other social 
      services = 0 otherwise 
                                                 
22 Many variables measured in this study are categorical in nature. Therefore, the technique of binary 
variables is employed to indicate the presence or absence of various attributes. So, it allows one to estimate 




INDS_FINST  = 1 if industry category is bank, insurance and other financial  
                                              institutions =  0 otherwise 
INDS_REALEST   = 1 if industry category is real estate, rental and other  
        business activities = 0 otherwise 
INDS_HOTEL    = 1 if industry category is hotel and other business; = 0   
             otherwise 
INDS_WHRET  = 1 if industry category is wholesale/retail; = 0 otherwise 
INDS_EDU   = 1 if industry category is education; = 0 otherwise 
Training 
TRA_VOC  = 1 if individual has vocational training; = 0 otherwise 
TRA_GEN  = 1 if individual has general training; = 0 otherwise 
TRA_TECH  = 1 if individual has technical training; = 0 otherwise 
Skill 
SKIL   = 1 if individual is skilled; = 0 otherwise 
Job Status 
W_EMPD   = 1 if individual is wage employed; = 0 otherwise 
SELF_EMPD  = 1 if individual is self-employed; = 0 otherwise 
C_WKR     = 1 if individual is a casual worker or day labourer; = 0    
       otherwise 
UNEMPS   = The number of months unemployed  
Family Status 
FEMALE_HHEAD   = No. of female household head 
MALE_HHEAD        = No. of male household head 
NMEN   = No. of males aged between 15 and 64 
NFEM   = No. of females aged between 15 and 64 
OLD01   = No. of males aged 65 and above 
OLD02   = No. of females aged 65 and above 
Asset Ownership 
ASST01  = 1 if individual has shop/business; = 0 otherwise 
ASST02  = 1 if individual has rickshaw/van/pushcart/boat; = 0 otherwise 
ASST03     = 1 if individual has sewing machine/shallow machine/tractor;     
   =  0  otherwise 
Home Ownership 
HRENT  = 1 if household is renting accommodation; = 0 otherwise 
HFREE  = 1 if household pays no rent; = 0 otherwise 
 
λ   = Inverse Mills Ratio 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:
 iSSC = Secondary School Certificate/ HSC = Higher Secondary School Certificate. 
 
 
Table AII. OLS Wage Equation Estimates: LFS 1999 – 2000  
(Dependent Variable: Natural logarithm of hourly wages) 
Variable         Urban Sample             Rural Sample 
         _________________________________________________________ 




       Coef            Coef               Coef         Coef 
Constant 4.0738 *** 5.2583 *** 4.8668 *** 6.5845 ***
(0.3440) (0.3000) (0.1700) (0.1853)
LN_MHRS -0.7526 *** -0.7003 *** -0.8534 *** -0.9378 ***
(0.0673) (0.0560) (0.0263) (0.0212)
AGE 0.0511 *** 0.0192 *** 0.0331 *** 0.0061 **
(0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0034) (0.0029)
AGESQ -0.0005 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0001 *
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
UNEMPS 0.0094 ** 0.1079 0.0034 0.0016
(0.0045) (0.2245) (0.0153) (0.0013)
TRA_VOC -0.0335 0.1262 0.0347 0.0516
(0.0803) (0.1856) (0.0936) (0.0590)
TRA_GEN 0.1828 *** 0.4231 *** -0.1678 ** 0.1850 **
(0.0529) (0.1125) (0.0680) (0.0861)
TRA_TECH 0.1313 *** 0.4574 *** -0.0301 -0.0624
(0.0504) (0.1405) (0.1068) (0.0700)
SELF_EMPD 1.1733 *** 0.1315 ** 1.2529 *** 0.3642 ***
(0.0569) (0.0619) (0.0262) (0.0468)
W_EMPD 0.9483 *** 0.3849 *** 0.9156 *** 0.0413
(0.0591) (0.0717) (0.0384) (0.0832)
C_WKR 0.5454 *** 0.1088 ** 0.5425 *** 0.1039 ***
(0.0616) (0.0486) (0.0228) (0.0325)
PRIM 0.1282 *** 0.1086 *** 0.1205 *** 0.0002
(0.0241) (0.0322) (0.0174) (0.0177)
SECOND 0.2640 *** 0.1103 ** 0.2390 *** 0.0198
(0.0252) (0.0439) (0.0205) (0.0263)
PSECON 0.5030 *** 0.1677 ** 0.3731 *** 0.1054 **
(0.0297) (0.0756) (0.0348) (0.0474)
GRAD 0.7762 *** 0.6417 *** 0.6021 *** 0.2913 **
(0.0433) (0.1101) (0.0659) (0.1427)
OCCUP_PROF 0.0165 0.4935 ** 0.1023 0.5967 ***
(0.0769) (0.2308) (0.2250) (0.1660)
OCCUP_CLERIC -0.1115 ** -0.1018 0.1034 0.2932
(0.0483) (0.1588) (0.0996) (0.2297)  
 
        
   
          
             
Table AII. continued 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable         Urban Sample                Rural Sample 




                 Males         Females               Males         Females 
       Coef           Coef      Coef         Coef 
OCCUP_SALES -0.0344 -0.1572 0.1271 -0.4614 **
(0.0608) (0.1910) (0.1082) (0.2278)
OCCUP_SER -0.2963 *** -0.8829 *** -0.0532 -0.7535 ***
(0.0578) (0.1412) (0.1026) (0.1870)
OCCUP_AGRI -0.0496 -0.6038 *** 0.0015 -0.5497 ***
(0.0763) (0.1463) (0.0984) (0.1544)
OCCUP_PROD -0.1514 *** -0.4871 *** 0.1542 * -0.7074 ***
(0.0496) (0.1458) (0.0922) (0.1818)
INDS_MANU 0.1607 ** -0.1455 * -0.1038 * 0.1221
(0.0661) (0.0848) (0.0559) (0.0867)
INDS_WHRET 0.0680 -0.1148 -0.1060 * -0.0648
(0.0697) (0.1287) (0.0638) (0.1658)
INDS_HOTEL 0.0646 0.2264 0.0702 -0.5538 **
(0.0835) (0.2848) (0.0889) (0.2407)
INDS_COMMU 0.0702 0.4432 ** -0.2298 *** 0.5509
(0.0659) (0.2195) (0.0606) (0.4341)
INDS_FINST 0.2963 *** 0.4208 ** 0.2250 * 0.9905 **
(0.0915) (0.1779) (0.1352) (0.4068)
INDS_REALEST 0.1691 0.4106 0.2448 * 1.2897 ***
(0.1304) (0.3341) (0.1256) (0.1463)
INDS_PUBADMN 0.2083 *** 0.4535 *** 0.2329 *** 1.4552 ***
(0.0720) (0.1213) (0.0727) (0.2091)
INDS_HLTH 0.0964 -0.1280 * -0.0703 0.0953
(0.0669) (0.0732) (0.0651) (0.1031)
INDS_EDU -0.1298 -0.3967 ** 0.0653 -0.0753
(0.0856) (0.1545) (0.1094) (0.2220)
SKIL 0.1579 *** 0.1808 *** 0.1811 *** 0.0595
(0.0196) (0.0481) (0.0157) (0.0395)
MARRIED 0.1571 *** -0.0628 0.0667 *** -0.0758 ***
(0.0304) (0.0395) (0.0250) (0.0221)  
No. of observations        5654             2221      6265           4097 
2 R                  0.479             0.671                 0.545           0.501 
Standard errors reported in parentheses and are computed robustly to account for heteroskedasticity. 
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